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Abstract 
 
Between September08 and June09, a period with significant market events, we surveyed UK 
online-brokerage customers at three-months intervals for their willingness to take risk, three-
months expectations of returns and risks for the market and their own portfolio, and self-reported 
risk attitude. This unique dataset allowed us to analyze how these variables changed over time, 
and whether changes in risk taking were related to changes in expectations and/or risk attitudes. 
Risk taking changed substantially during the period, as did return and risk expectations. Numeric 
assessments of return and risk expectations were only weakly correlated with corresponding 
subjective judgments. Consistent with the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, changes in risk taking were 
associated with changes in subjective expectations of market portfolio risk and returns, but less 
with changes in numeric expectations. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis and its aftermath bring questions about risk taking back 
to the fore. What determines how much risk private investors take? How and why does risk taking 
change when shocks to the system occur? How long do such changes in risk taking last? 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) found long lasting cohort effects in investors who experienced the 
great depression but today’s investors and their experiences are very different, and today’s 
economic depressions of shorter duration may not have the same impact.  
The recent financial crisis also renewed calls for greater consumer information and 
protection, initiatives that require better knowledge about the investment decision processes of the 
public. Consumer finance has recently been identified as a field vastly understudied given its 
importance to the national and international economy (Campbell et al, 2011; Campbell, 2006; 
Tufano, 2009). Such relative neglect is due, at least in part, to the fact that economic transactions 
of individuals and households are hard to observe and interpret with traditional economic 
methods. As a result, psychologists and behavioral economists have started to use panel data, 
where representative sets of respondents answer questions about their values, beliefs, and 
expectations
1
, which in addition to socioeconomic variables can then be related to their 
hypothetical or real choices, a methodology also employed by our study. Far from being a 
negative, the hypothetical nature of such investment decisions allows people to show what they 
would do, based on their beliefs and expectations at a specific point in time, without constraints 
                                                          
1 E.g., in the US, the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study (HRS) survey 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php?p=qnaires and the Survey of Economic Expectations http://www.disc. 
wisc.edu/econexpect/Index.html; in Germany, the ZEW Bankprognosen survey 
http://www.zew.de/de/publikationen/bankprognosen/index.php and the Socio-Economic Panel 
http://www.diw.de/deutsch/soep/29004.html.  
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by inertia or other factors. For an overview of the pros and cons of survey data see Manski (2005). 
 
By repeating such surveys over time, we can assess the effect of external events on beliefs and 
expectations and test the strong assumption that decision makers have objectively correct, i.e. 
rational expectations.  
Our online survey, designed in collaboration with the behavioral finance team at Barclays, 
questioned the bank’s online-brokerage customers between September 08 and June 09 in three-
months intervals about their expectations of risk and returns of market and personal portfolios, 
their risk attitudes, and hypothetical risk taking behavior. Figure 1 charts the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange (FTSE) share index of all eligible companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange’s main market over the time period of our surveys. The figure shows that this was a 
period of high stock market uncertainty and volatility, beginning in September 08 before some 
important financial crisis events like Lehman Brothers and AIG in the US, and Northern Rock, 
HBOS and other banks in the UK, and continuing through some additional declines and then some 
market recovery in 2009. Our respondents were online investors who frequently trade in stocks 
and other securities, providing greater external validity to our results than those of studies that 
have used student samples (Baucells and Villasis, 2010; Harrison et al., 2005).  
Insert Figure 1 here 
All four surveys measured financial risk taking with the task of investing £100,000 either 
into the U.K. stock market (FTSE-All-Share) or into a risk free asset with a guaranteed interest 
rate of 4%. Greater percentages invested into the stock market are indications of greater risk 
taking. We expected changes in risk taking over the period of the survey, given external events. 
Commenting on the financial crisis in September08, the New York Times reported that “investors 
around the world frantically moved their money into the safest investments like Treasury bills”, 
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and changes in risk taking have also been reported in other situations (Staw, 1976; Thaler and 
Johnson, 1990; M. Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). The more important 
question is what drives such changes in risk taking. Our goal is to decompose risk taking into 
different contributing variables and to examine the influence of changes in these variables on any 
observed changes in risk taking.  
Classic portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) assumes that investors’ individual risk taking 
depends on investors' risk attitude as well as on investors’ estimates about the expected return and 
volatility (variance) of the investment. In this model, risk attitude, i.e. the trade-off between 
expected return and volatility is determined by the curvature of the investor’s utility function. 
Note that investors can have different subjective estimates of expected return and volatility:  
Risk Taking = f(Expected Return,  Volatility, Risk Attitude).
1
           (1) 
Equation (1) allows for heterogeneous beliefs but still specifies return and risk at the first 
two moments of the return distribution which might be individually estimated. A more general 
risk-return framework (Sarin and M. Weber, 1993; E. Weber and Milliman, 1997; Jia et al., 1999) 
allows subjects to have return and risk estimates not necessarily equal to the moments of the 
distribution or even measured on quantitative scales. Here risk attitude determines the trade-off 
between risk and return and might be directly assessed by asking the investor: 
Risk Taking = f(Return, Risk, Risk Attitude).               (2) 
                                                          
1
 All equations (1) – (3) are for an individual investor i, i.e. Risk Takingi = f(Expected Returni,  Volatilityi, Risk 
Attitudei). We omit the subscripts for reasons of simplicity. 
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In the Markowitz model (1) as well as in such a psychophysical risk-return model (2), (E. Weber 
and Johnson, 2008), changes, denoted , in risk taking can result from changes in one or more of 
these three determinants of risk taking, e.g. for the psychophysical model:  
Risk Taking = f( Return, Risk, Risk Attitude).     (3) 
Better understanding the determinants of investor risk taking is not only of theoretical 
interest, but also has practical implications for financial regulatory requirements in Europe and 
ongoing discussions about such regulation in the United States. The Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) by the European Parliament and the European Council (2004 and 
2006) requires investment firms to obtain “information as is necessary for the firm to understand 
the essential facts about the customer” (Article 35, 1) and to elicit the customers' “preferences 
regarding risk taking, his risk profile, and the purpose of the investment” (Article 35, 4). 
However, MiFID provides no guidelines about how or how often investment advisors need to 
elicit risk preferences and risk profiles, and what “essential facts about the customer” should be 
collected. To close this gap, our study examines whether risk attitudes and/or risk or return 
estimates of investors change over time, and which of these changes impact risk taking.  
Model components were elicited in two different ways. Individual numeric judgments of 
best guess (median) returns and volatility in returns (computed from median, worst-case and best-
case percentage return estimates) can serve as proxies of individual investor beliefs most closely 
related to the return and risk variables of the classical risk—return model of risk taking of 
Equation 1. In contrast, elicitations of investors’ more qualitative risk and return expectations on 
subjective rating scales ranging from ‘extremely bad’ to extremely good’ for returns, and from 
‘not at all risky’ to ‘extremely risky’ for risk as in Equation (2) allow investors to incorporate 
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feelings of hope or fear (Loewenstein at al., 2001), i.e., sentiments that may not make it into 
numeric estimates of such quantities but may nevertheless determine financial decisions (Barberis 
et al., 1998; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; E. Weber and Hsee, 1998). Building on results for 
expected risk by E. Weber at al.(2005), we predict and find that the numeric and subjective 
measures of risk and return expectations are not highly correlated and that subjective expectation 
measures predict risk taking far better than numeric expectations. 
As shown in Figure 2, risk taking, i.e., the percentage of their hypothetical £100,000 stake 
investors would invest into the U.K. stock market for the next three months changed significantly 
over the surveyed period. Investments into the risky asset vs. a guaranteed 4% return asset 
dropped from 56.0% in September 08 to 52.8% in December 08, and even lower to 46.5% in 
March 09, but then increased again to 53.5% in June 09. Over that same time period, self reported 
risk attitudes further described below were stable on average. In contrast and also shown in Figure 
2, subjective market portfolio risk expectations and return expectations, the measures most 
predictive of risk taking, changed across assessment periods. Changes in risk expectations 
mirrored changes in risk taking, with risk expectations increasing from September 08 to 
December 08, staying at the same level in March 09, and then decreasing in June 09. Subjective 
market portfolio return expectations were quite wrong in the first rounds of the survey, however, 
the increases in March 09 and June 09 were roughly in line with the real market.  
Previewing our results, changes in risk taking were explained by changes in subjective risk 
and return expectations for the market portfolio and to a lesser degree by changes in self-reported 
risk attitude. This result remains stable even when we control for investors’ previous three months 
personal stock market experience and for memories of recent market performance.  
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Insert Figure 2 here 
Our results have important practical implications as risk attitude, see Figure 3, is pretty 
stable, it does not need repeated assessment. In contrast, subjective risk and return expectations 
change with external market events, though not necessarily in a rational way. This suggests more 
frequent assessment of these quantities and some educational interventions to correct faulty 
expectations.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
Our results extend the empirical and experimental literature on risk taking in several 
important ways. Whereas previous studies have documented changes in risk taking, using either 
field data (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) or lab data in reaction to 
prior gains and losses (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; M. Weber and Zuchel, 2005), our study is the 
first to identify mediators of such changes, namely changes in subjective risk and return 
expectations, and to do so for a sample of online investors. Previous studies that examined 
changes in expectations and/or risk attitudes looked at only one of these variables in isolation: risk 
expectations (Glaser and M. Weber, 2005; E. Weber and Milliman, 1997), return expectations 
(Shiller et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 2004; Hanoch et al., 2006) and risk attitudes (Sahm, 2007; 
Klos, 2008). Most of these studies did not relate changes in expectations and risk attitudes to 
changes in risk taking. In addition, we extend the results of Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and 
Dominitz and Manski (2007), who used survey data to show that greater expected equity returns 
were associated with a greater probability of holding stocks, in several ways: by including risk 
expectations and risk attitudes as predictor variables, by examining changes in return and risk 
expectations and their influence on changes in risk taking, and by using a different measure of risk 
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taking, namely asset allocation. Finally, we extend results about the superiority of subjective over 
numeric judgments of risk to predict risk taking (E. Weber et al., 2005), by showing that the same 
is true for subjective over numeric judgments of returns.  
Section 2 of this paper provides a literature review that motivates our hypotheses. Section 
3 presents information on survey respondents and the survey design. The main results are reported 
in Section 4, and Section 5 discusses the implications of our results. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that risk taking of individual investors, i.e., their allocation of 
wealth to risky and risk free assets, can substantially vary over time and in response to market 
events. According to the Deutsche Aktieninstitut (2008), 6.2 million people in Germany in 2000 at 
the height of the internet boom directly held part of their wealth in stocks, whereas this number 
dropped to 3.5 million by the end of 2008, the time of the financial crisis. The Wall Street Journal 
(2008) similarly reports on December 5, 2008 that, in response to the dramatic events on financial 
markets, investors pulled $72 billion from stock funds in October alone and moved their money 
into government bonds and cash holdings.  
Lab studies also show that risk taking is far from stable. Because preferences are 
constructed and stochastic, small differences in choice context can sometimes lead to preference 
reversals (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). Camerer (1989) and Hey and Orme (1994) gave 
respondents the same set of choice options twice, about 10 days apart, and found that 25%-30% of 
choices were different across the two time periods. Staw (1976) showed that risk taking depended 
on previously experienced outcomes, with respondents taking significantly more risks on the same 
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investment opportunity following a loss than a gain, a phenomenon he labeled escalation of 
commitment. This is consistent with the disposition effect identified by Odean (1998) and M. 
Weber and Camerer (1998), where investors are more reluctant to sell losing stocks than winning 
stocks. Thaler and Johnson (1990), on the other hand, found the reverse effect, i.e. enhanced risk 
taking after gains than after losses, which they called the house money effect. M. Weber and 
Zuchel (2005) subsequently reconciled the conflicting escalation of commitment and house 
money effects by showing that the framing of the situation matters. The “house money effect” is 
prevalent when the situation is framed as a lottery, whereas the escalation of commitment effect is 
predominant when the situation is framed as an investment. E. Weber at al. (2002) also found 
differences in risk taking for risky financial choices when choices were described as gambling 
decisions than when they were described as investment decisions. 
These studies show that the personal experience of winning or losing can influence 
subsequent risk taking, presumably because the affective reactions to prior gains or losses 
influence perceptions of risk and/or return of subsequent choice options (Loewenstein et. al., 
2001). In other situations, outcome feedback has a learning function. Positive or negative 
outcomes provide additional information about expected returns and risks of this option. E. Weber 
et al. (2004) showed that risk taking is more variable for decisions from experience where the 
decision maker must gradually learn about choice options from repeated outcome feedback than 
for decisions from description where outcomes and their likelihood are numerically or graphically 
described. This is especially true, when low probability events are involved. Risk taking for 
decisions from experience is more variable because outcomes that recently occurred have a large 
impact. This suggests that economic shocks should increase risk expectations and lower return 
expectations and should thus decrease risk taking, and that these effects should disappear as 
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outcomes become more favorable again. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) found that the great 
depression had a surprisingly long lasting impact by reducing risk taking of people who lived 
through it, though this may have been the result of the extended time period (more than a decade) 
over which negative outcomes were experienced.  
In summary, there are reasons to expect that people’s risk taking will vary from September 
08 to June 09, which included at least one large market shock in the first month:   
Hypothesis 1(a): Financial risk taking will vary over survey period, i.e., the proportion of 
the initial endowment of £100,000 invested into the U.K. stock market (FTSE-All-Share) and 
not into the risk free asset with a guaranteed interest rate of 4% will be statistically different 
from time period to time period. 
Rational models allow for changes in risk attitudes as the result of changes in income or 
wealth. The fact that an increase in wealth should result in a greater risk taking or a decrease in 
relative risk aversion is a key implication of difference habits models. When Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2008) tested this implication empirically, they found that, while wealth changes affected 
investors’ decision to participate in stock markets, they hardly had any effect on asset allocation 
decisions, i.e. on the proportion a household invested in risky vs. risk free assets. Guiso et al. 
(2003) analyzed stock ownership in major European countries and also found that the percentage 
of wealth invested in the stock market was independent of investors' absolute level of wealth.  
Lab and field experiments that infer risk attitudes directly from choices (e.g. Holt and 
Laury, 2002) confound possible individual or situational differences in expected risks and returns 
with true differences in attitude towards risk (E. Weber and Milliman, 1997; E. Weber and Hsee, 
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1998; E. Weber and Johnson, 2008).  When risk taking is equated with risk attitude, risk attitude 
often appears to be domain specific, because risk taking varies across domains. Investment risk 
taking, for example, is typically not very highly correlated with risk taking in lottery tasks (E. 
Weber at al., 2002; Nosić and M. Weber, 2010). Panel surveys such as the Socio-Economic Panel 
(Dohmen et al., 2011) or the Michigan Health and Retirement Survey have assessed risk attitude 
with psychometric methods instead, i.e., from answers to attitudinal statements on Likert-scales, a 
method also used in our survey. As one would expect of a trait measure, Klos (2008) found 
individual risk attitudes reported in the 2004 and 2006 Socio-Economic Panel to be stable over 
time. Sahm (2007) also reported relatively high stability of risk attitudes within individuals over 
time using the Health and Retirement panel data set with more than 12,000 observations. Hence, 
we expected self-reported attitude towards risk to be stable across our sampling period: 
Hypothesis 1(b): Risk attitudes will be stable over survey period, i.e., self-reported risk 
attitudes will not be statistically different from time period to time period. 
  Changes in return expectations have been analyzed extensively empirically. Dominitz and 
Manski (2005) investigate the dynamics of expectations in the Survey of Economic Expectations 
(1999-2001) and in the Michigan Survey of Consumers (2002-2004) and found that expectations 
were not perfectly stable over time but that differences between individuals were larger than 
differences within person over time. Using cross-sectional UBS/Gallup surveys, Fisher and 
Statman (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) showed that people's long- and short-term return 
expectations change substantially over time. Using data from the 1998-2003 surveys, Vissing-
Jorgensen (2003) showed that average 1-year expectations range from a high of 15.8% in January 
2000 to a low of around 6% at the end of 2002, a change in expectations largely in line with 
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returns experienced at the time, and thus a result consistent with documented recency effects in 
experience-based learning and choice (E. Weber at al., 2004). In contrast, also using between-
subject data, Glaser and M. Weber (2005) showed that return expectations after the 9/11 event of 
2001 and the subsequent market downturn were not in line with recently experienced returns, but 
significantly higher than return expectations before the event, suggesting that respondents 
believed in some form of market mean reversion.  
Risk expectations can also be assumed to relate to individuals' past experiences with 
similar events or situations (E. Weber and Hsee, 1998). Loewenstein et al. (2001) argue that risky 
choice options are evaluated affectively (“risk as a feeling”), and that prior outcomes, good as 
well as bad ones, influence this emotional response and the way individuals perceive the risk of a 
situation. E. Weber and Milliman (1997) and Mellers et al. (1997) experimentally showed that risk 
perceptions change after participants have experienced either good or bad outcomes. Consistent 
with such experiential learning, Glaser and M. Weber (2005) found volatility estimates to be 
significantly higher after the terror attacks of September 11 than before.  
In summary, previous evidence suggests that both risk and return expectations can vary 
substantially over time, as the result of macroeconomic events or individually experienced gains 
or losses. Whereas perceptions of risk consistently increase under adverse conditions, expectations 
of returns at times reflect experienced events and trends and at other times reflect a belief in mean 
reversion:  
Hypothesis 1(c): Risk and return expectations will fluctuate over survey period, i.e., will be 
statistically different from time period to time period. 
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Our data will allow us to test what drives changes in risk taking. Consistent with the 
previously presented literature we hypothesize that changes in risk taking over time are driven by 
changes in risk and return expectations and not by changes in risk attitude.  
Hypothesis 1(d): Changes in risk taking will be mediated by changes in risk and return 
expectations. 
Hypothesis 1 (c) raises questions about both the origin and the target of investors’ risk and 
return expectations. Behavioral research suggests that investors’ expectations may not be based 
only on economic data, but also on affective reactions such as hopes and fears. Asking investors 
to predict median as well as worst and best case returns for the next three months is the standard 
way to measure numeric risk and return expectations, but this method does not allow respondents 
to express their hopes and fears which may, nevertheless, influence their investment choices (E.  
Weber et al., 2005). This suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Subjective measures of risk and return expectations will predict risk taking 
better than numeric measures, i.e., subjective measures of risk and return expectations will 
account for a greater proportion of the variance in risk taking across investors than numeric 
measures. 
3. Data 
3.1 Survey Respondents and Procedure 
Our online survey was designed in collaboration with the behavioral finance team at Barclays and 
administered in September 08, December 08, March 09, and June 09. Over 90% of respondents 
completed the September 08 survey before the 12
th
 of September, i.e., before the bankruptcy of 
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Lehman Brothers and the subsequent downturn on financial markets.
2
 Respondents were selected 
as a stratified sample of Barclays Stockbrokers' client base, where Age, Number of deals per year, 
Number of holdings, and Portfolio value were used as strata. This provided a representative 
sample, while also accommodating our collaborating bank's desire to undersample clients who 
trade very little (Number of deals per year≤1) or had a relatively low portfolio value (Portfolio 
value<£1,000).
3
 
A total of 19,251 clients, approximately 5% of customers, were invited by email in late 
August/early September to participate in the survey. Of those, 4,520 (23%) opened the email. Of 
those who opened the email, 849 (20%) went to the website and in the end, 479 out of these 849 
subjects completed the survey. This response rate is slightly lower but in the same ballpark as 
response rates in similar studies by Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Glaser and M. Weber (2007). 
It took respondents on average 24 minutes to answer the survey. 
The 479 investors who answered the September08 survey were contacted again by email 
in late November/early December 08 and invited to participate in a shorter version of the earlier 
survey.
4
 Of those, 240 participated for a second time in December. In addition, Barclays sent out 
an email invitation to a different set of 700 customers who had not been previously contacted, in 
                                                          
2
 Barclays did not collect the specific date on which each respondent completed the survey. However, the online 
service remained open only for a maximum of two weeks, with the majority of participants answering within the first 
week. 
3
 In all strata in which trades were less than once a year or portfolio value of less than £1,000, a lower percentage of 
clients were invited to participate in the survey than in the remaining strata . Note that although we did undersample, 
we did not exclude these clients, and more than 16% of approached individuals had a portfolio value below £1,000. 
 
4 The first version of the survey included more demographics, individual characteristics, and various behavioral client 
profiling questions, that are used by Barclays Wealth within their advisory process. 
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order to increase the sample size.
5
 This resulted in an additional 138 respondents who joined the 
panel in December and who completed the longer version of the survey at this point. In March 09 
and June 09, all 617 investors who had previously participated in at least one round were 
contacted again and invited to participate in one more round, with the shorter version of the 
survey. Overall, 259 investors participated only once, 138 twice, 131 three times, and 89 all four 
times.  
In contrast to previous studies of online brokerage customers (Dorn and Huberman, 2005; 
Glaser and M. Weber, 2007) that analyzed one-period survey responses, our dataset provided 
repeated observations of the same investors over time, thus allowing us to regress changes in the 
dependent measure (risk taking) onto changes in a series of predictor variables. Such analysis 
requires participants who completed at least two consecutive surveys, i.e. in September and 
December, in December and March, in March and June, or participated in three or four 
consecutive periods.  
To identify potential selection biases, we compared survey participants to the adult British 
population, and also compared investors who participated only once with those that participated 
twice, three or four times, respectively. Table 1 provides mean demographics for all participants 
of our study (Group
all
) and for the adult British population (GB
all
), respectively. The next four 
columns provide mean demographics separately for respondents who participated only once, 
twice, three times, and in all four surveys. The average age of survey participants was 51.4 years, 
four years older than the average British adult. Survey participants were more likely to be male 
                                                          
5 These 700 had previously participated in another marketing related event of Barclays Wealth and had indicated their 
willingness to participate in surveys. 
 
 
 
17 
(0.93 vs. 0.49) compared to the British average. Gross income was highly skewed with a mean of 
£76,616 and a median of £60,000 and substantially larger than the median British income of 
£30,000. Clearly, our respondents were not representative of the typical British adult. However, 
being predominantly male and having a substantially larger gross income than the overall 
population makes them similar to the German private investor population sampled by Dorn and 
Huberman (2005).  
There are hardly any differences between the investor subgroups who participated once, 
twice, three, or four times, respectively. Only the level of investable wealth, measured in 9 
categories from 1 (£0 - £10,000) to 9 (> £1 million), differs significantly. Investors who 
participated only once had substantially lower investable wealth than investors who participated 
more frequently.
6
 Since the main goal of our study is to analyze changes in different variables at 
an individual level over time, differences in wealth between the four subgroups should not be 
problematic. Investor wealth was also included as a control variable. We conducted a similar 
analysis not reported here comparing demographics as well as expectations for those who 
participated in each subsequent round vs. those who did not participate in the next round and 
found no significant differences.   
Insert Table 1 here 
3.2 Survey Design  
 Besides demographics and other individual characteristics described above and collected 
only in the first survey in which respondents participated, the following variables, summarized in 
                                                          
6
 We deliberately gave subjects the option not to answer the questions about income and wealth. Nevertheless, both 
questions were answered by slightly above 80% of the subjects.    
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Table 2, were elicited every three months. The appendix presents the exact wording of the 
questions as well as the order in which the questions were posed. 
Financial Risk taking: Participants were asked to invest £100,000 either into the U.K. stock 
market (FTSE-All-Share) or into a risk free asset with a guaranteed interest rate of 4%, with a 
greater percentage allocated to the stock market indicating greater risk taking. Using hypothetical 
choices vs. transaction data has advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage of using real 
transaction data to make inferences about risk taking in portfolio allocations is that it is hardly 
possible to obtain complete information on total asset holdings of individuals at all banks at which 
they have an account. We also know that real transactions are subject to investor inertia and 
temporary practical constraints that may not be constant from period to period. Hypothetical risk 
taking with a new stake of equal size provided at each time period does not have these constraints 
and thus offers a cleaner measure of the effect of changes in risk and return expectations or 
changes in risk attitude. However, hypothetical actions are hypothetical, and some might argue 
that such data reflect cheap talk. As outlined in the introduction, such survey data should be seen 
as an additional and complementary source of data to understand determinants of changes in 
investor risk taking.   
Risk attitudes: In the September 08 and December 08 surveys we used the three questions shown 
in Table 2 from Barclays' 8-question psychometric scale of investors' risk attitude. Brooks et al. 
(2008) show that this scale differentiates individuals with low risk tolerance from those with high 
risk tolerance and that it has high reliability. All three questions were answered on a 7-point Likert 
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scale with the endpoints “1 = Strongly Disagree” and “7 = Strongly Agree”.7 In the March and 
June survey, only the most diagnostic of these three risk attitude measures was elicited, i.e. Risk 
Attitude 2: “It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment.”.  
Expected return and expected risk: As described above, risk and return expectations were 
elicited in two different ways, one quantitative/numeric, the other qualitative/subjective. Crossed 
with that, we also asked investors for their risk and return expectations over the next three months 
for (a) the U.K. market portfolio (FTSE-All-Share) and (b) for their own investment portfolio at 
the bank. To get respondents’ quantitative/numeric risk and return expectations, we asked them to 
state their best guess (median estimate) for the three-month percentage return, followed by a lower 
and upper bound on the three-months percentage return they had provided, such that there would 
only be a 5% chance that the return in three months would be below the lower bound and a 5% 
chance that it would be higher than the upper bound. Numeric return expectations for the market 
(Market-Return-Num.) or for an investor's own portfolio (Own-Return-Num.) are equal to the best 
guess for the market and own portfolio return, respectively. To obtain numeric risk expectations, 
we used the two point approximation to the variance of outcomes suggested by Keefer and Bodily 
(1983), which transforms stated upper and lower bounds into volatility estimates and has been 
widely used in the empirical literature (e.g. Graham and Harvey, 2005 and Glaser et al., 2007).
8
 
                                                          
7 Bollen and Barb (1981) and Alwin and Krosnick (1991) have shown that reliability, validity, and discriminating 
power increases up to 7-point scales and that, after this, additional effects can hardly be observed. Moreover, 
Viswanathan et al. (2004) argue that the number of response categories should be as close as possible to a natural 
number of categories for a specific question, and that one should not overburden respondents with too hard a task.  
8
 For the two point approximation of variance we use: 
, see Keefer and Bodily (1983, p. 597)   
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This provided us with the two numeric risk expectation measures Market-Risk-Num. and Own-
Risk-Num.  
For the two qualitative/subjective measures of return expectations (Market-Return-Subj. 
and Own-Return-Subj.), respondents were asked how they would rate the returns they expected 
from the market and their own portfolio over the next three months, on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from “1 = Extremely bad return” to “7 = Extremely good return”. Similarly, the 
qualitative/subjective measures of risk expectations (Market-Risk-Subj. and Own-Risk-Subj.) were 
obtained as judgments of expected market risk and expected own portfolio risk over the next three 
months, on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “1 = Not risky at all” to “7 = Extremely risky”. 
 Past performance: We elicited participants' memories of past performance, both of the U.K. 
stock market in general (FTSE-All-Share) and of their own portfolio over the last three months, 
using two elicitation methods: (a) as a numeric (percentage return) estimate (PastPerf.Own-Num 
and PastPerf.Market-Num) and (b) as a qualitative subjective judgment on 7-point Likert scales 
with the endpoints “1 = Extremely bad return” and “7 = Extremely good return” (PastPerf.Own-
Subj. and PastPerf.Market-Subj.). In addition, we also asked respondents for their numeric 
(percentage) estimates of past three-months returns of their personal investments held at other 
banks (PastPerf.External).  
Insert Table 2 here 
3.3 Differences in Responses between Groups With Different Response Rates 
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To test for any selection bias in our data, i.e., the question whether participants who completed 
one, two, three or four surveys provided different answers on any of the above variables, we 
conducted a series of Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. We found a very small number of significant 
differences not more than can be expected by chance alone, scattered over different variables with 
no discernable pattern, suggesting that there were no differences on these variables between these 
groups of respondents. As mentioned earlier, we did a similar analysis for those who answered in 
the following round vs. those who did not answer, which also showed no significant differences. 
4. Results 
4.1 Risk Taking, Risk Attitude, and Risk and Return Expectations across Time 
Table 3 reports the means of all repeatedly elicited variables in our study, for the four 
assessed periods.
9
 The last three columns in Table 3 report Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics 
that indicate whether the difference in value for that variable is significant between two successive 
survey administrations. These tests only use data from respondents who participated in the two 
respective surveys, i.e., use only within-subject data.  
For Risk-Taking we observe, consistent with Hypothesis 1(a), that the percentage of the 
£100,000 stake that investors are willing to place into the market (FTSE-All-Share) varies 
substantially. As shown in Figure 2 and Table 3, risk taking decreases from 56.0% in September 
08, to 52.8% in December 08 and further to 46.5% in March 09, and then increases again to 
53.5% in June 09. All differences are significant at the 1% level.  
                                                          
9
 Table 3 includes values only for respondents who participated in at least two of the four surveys, but results are 
essentially the same  if we either include the data for all 617 investors or restrict ourselves to the 89 investors who 
participated four times. 
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In contrasts, there are hardly any changes in self-reported risk attitudes over the four time 
periods. Risk Attitude 2 (“It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment”) 
and Risk Attitude 7 (“Even if I experienced a significant loss on an investment, I would still 
consider making risky investments”) are virtually the same in September 08 and in December 08. 
Risk Attitude 6 (“I am a financial risk taker”) rises slightly from 4.43 to 4.61 from September 08 
to December 08, a difference significant at the 5% level, but in a direction that is inconsistent with 
the observed declines in risk taking over that time period. From March 09 onward, we only 
elicited Risk Attitude 2, the single most diagnostic measure from Barclays’ 8-question scale, with 
a distribution of responses that covered the full range of values across investors, as shown in 
Figure 3, but which, as Table 3 shows, did not change across time periods. There were only minor 
variations at the individual-subject level, and over 56% of those participating in all four rounds 
did not change their self-reported risk attitude scores across that time period by more than a single 
point on the 7-point Likert scale. This stability of risk attitudes across time is in line with findings 
in Sahm (2007) and Baucells and Villasis (2010) and supports Hypothesis 1(b).  
As in Hypothesis 1(c), risk expectations changed considerably over time, in ways mostly 
consistent with market events. Thus all four risk expectation measures (Market-Risk-Num., 
Market-Risk-Subj., Own-Risk-Num., and Own-Risk-Subj.) were significantly higher in December 
08 than September 08, following the Lehman Brothers collapse and subsequent market decline 
and volatility increase, as shown in Table 3. Whereas the numeric volatility estimates of risk 
stayed steady or increased from December 08 to March 09 and June 09, consistent with market 
behavior, subjective risk expectations that are likely more affect- than analysis-based stayed 
steady from December 08 to March 09, but then significantly decreased by June 09, indicating 
perhaps some habituation to the continuing volatility, i.e., a decrease in worry or concern.  
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Return expectations were similarly variable over time, consistent with Hypothesis 1(c), 
though less so than risk expectations. As shown in Table 3, both the numeric and the subjective 
return expectations were positive (numeric) or slightly positive (subjective) from September 08 to 
June 09
10
. This suggests that for the first three survey rounds respondents expected some form of 
market correction for subsequent periods. Also shown in Table 3, investors’ numeric estimates of 
past market performance were not too far off actual market returns. The performance of the 
FTSE-All-Share for the three month period before the questionnaire was distributed was 
approximately -12% for September 08, -25%  for December 08, -8%  for March 09, and +14% for 
June 09.  
In summary, our results are consistent with Hypotheses 1(a) to (c). Moreover, our results 
are robust, i.e., remain essentially the same if we analyze differences only for those investors who 
participated three or four times or if we include all observations at each point of time. 
Insert Table 3 here 
4.2 Differences between Numeric and Subjective Assessments of Risk and Return 
Expectations for Market Portfolio and Own Portfolio 
 Table 4(a) Panel A shows the correlations between the numeric and the subjective measure 
of the four solicited expectations (returns and risks, for market and own portfolio, respectively), 
for each of the four survey rounds. The pattern of correlations is very consistent across time 
periods. While all correlations are significant at the .05 level or higher, there are much higher 
correlations between the numeric and the subjective elicitation value for return expectations than 
                                                          
10
 The only exception is a slight, but non-significant decrease in the numeric return expectation from March 09 to 
June 09. 
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for risk expectations (Wilcoxon signed-rank test z = 2.52; p<.02). The same pattern also holds for 
the correlation of changes, Table 4(a) Panel B, which are generally lower, significant for return 
and not significant for risk. This is consistent with prior studies that have found much closer 
correspondence between subjective return expectations and normative values such as the expected 
value of past returns of investment options than between subjective risk expectations and 
normative values such as the variance or standard deviation of past returns (E. Weber and Hsee, 
1998; E. Weber at al., 2005).  
 Table 4(b) Panel A shows that there are reasonably high correlations (from .48 to .64) 
between investors’ risk and return expectations for the market and their own portfolios when the 
expectations are assessed numerically. This is also true for return expectations assessed 
subjectively (from .45 to .64), but the correlations are much reduced for subjectively assessed risk 
expectations (from .27 to .37). While investors on average exhibit some optimism or “better than 
average” bias, as shown in Table 3, where subjective return estimates are better (t = 7.92, 
p<.00001) and subjective risk estimates lower (t = -13.25; p<.00001) for own portfolios than for 
the market portfolio, it is possible that different feelings influence the subjective risk expectations 
of different investors for their own portfolios (for some perhaps hope, while for others fear), thus 
lowering the correlation between this estimate and their subjective risk expectation for the market. 
Again the results are remarkably consistent across the four time periods. The correlations of 
changes (Panel B) again show the same pattern as in Panel A, with most correlation coefficients 
being somewhat lower.  
 Table 4(c) Panel A provides some results indicative of investors’ financial sophistication. 
Finucane et al. (2000) observed that people’s risk and return expectations often show a negative 
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relationship, i.e., options with higher return expectations are being perceived as carrying lower 
risks, contrary to the actual positive relationship between risks and returns between assets in 
efficient markets. This negative relation can be seen as evidence that people use their affect 
towards an investment to judge both its expected risk and return, with more positive-feeling 
choice options being seen as less risky and as yielding greater returns. Table 4(c) shows that, 
different from studies using university students, the investors in our study did not show such a 
negative relationship in their numeric judgments about their own portfolio. In an analysis across 
subjects, their numeric judgments correctly implied a positive relationship between risk and return 
expectations for their own portfolios.
11
  However, for the more qualitative /subjective judgments 
of expectations, even this set of relatively prosperous and experienced personal investors showed 
significant negative correlations between what they expected for risks and returns for the market 
portfolio, and much smaller positive or zero correlation for their own portfolio, suggesting that 
subjective feelings can affect the perceptions and actions of even financially sophisticated 
investors, as also shown by Holtgrave and E. Weber (1993). Panel B shows that there is 
essentially no relationship between changes in risk expectations and changes in return 
expectations in our data.   
Insert Table 4 here  
4.3 What Predicts Risk Taking and Drives Changes in Risk Taking? 
Although we are mostly interested in the relationship between changes in different 
variables (equation 3), we first present an analysis testing Equation (2), the more general risk-
                                                          
11
 Within investors the picture is inconclusive, some show positive others negative correlations over time. 
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return framework. Table 5 Column 1 shows that risk taking significantly depends on risk attitude. 
As proposed by the framework Column 2 shows that risk taking also depends on subjective 
market risk and return expectations and also on numeric return expectation (though less 
significantly so) but not on numeric risk expectation which turns out to be significant in Column 4 
where demographic control variables are included. Numbers in Table 5 are coefficients in a Tobit 
model, i.e., cannot interpreted directly. Taking the coefficient “3.3” for risk attitude (Column 2) 
marginal effects show that a higher risk tolerance of one step results in a 2.82% higher investment 
in the risky asset.
12
  
Column 3 shows that higher past performance measured on a subjective scale results in 
higher risk taking. Including demographics (Column 4), we find that being male and having a 
larger number of dependents leads to marginally significant more risk-taking. All other variables 
show no effect.  Column 5 and 6 also include estimates about investors’ own portfolio. We find 
hardly any significant effect for these variables whereas the results for the other variables remain 
stable.  
Insert Table 5 about here    
 The analysis underlying Table 5 allows us to test Hypothesis 2. We ran two Tobit 
regressions including round dummies with risk taking as the dependent variable. Predictor 
variables are market estimates: Either numeric expectations for return and risk or subjective 
expectations for return and risk. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find the R
2
  to be higher for 
subjective factors (.0171 vs. .0056), the t-statistics to be larger (return: subjective 8.79 vs. numeric 
                                                          
12
 For the Market variables the marginal effects are: .20, -16.40, 4.90 and –3.64, e.g. a 10%-points higher return 
expectation (Market-Return-Numeric) leads to 2%-points increase in  investment in the risky asset.  
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3.52; risk: subjective –4.85 vs. numeric – 1.10) and the F-value to be larger for the regression with 
subjective factors (31.16 vs. 8.08).   
In addition to the direct influence of past performance variables on risk taking shown in 
Table 5, there seems to be an indirect effect. Table 6 shows that past return variables are related to 
both numeric and subjective return expectations. We find that past performance better explains 
subjective return expectations than numeric return expectations as R
2
 are larger for regressions 
with subjective variables as dependent variables than with numeric variables. Subjective numeric 
return expectations are significantly related to subjective numeric past performance measures. 
Especially for subjective return predictions, all four regression coefficients are positive, i.e. higher 
past returns estimations imply higher future return predictions.   
Insert Table 6 here 
Table 7 shows the same variables as listed in Table 3, now separated for investors whose 
risk taking either increased or decreased between two successive time periods (Δ RiskTaking >0; 
Δ RiskTaking < 0) for the three comparison time periods (September 08 - December 08; 
December 08 - March 09; March 09 - June 09). The last column for each time comparison shows 
the results of Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. 
Variables that differ between these two groups of respondents are potential predictors of 
risk taking. Table 7 shows that this rules out measures of risk attitudes, which hardly show any 
difference between the two groups for all three transitions in time.
13
 Changes in investors’ risk 
and return expectations for their own portfolios mostly also do not differ significantly between the 
                                                          
13 Note that Diff. Risk Attitude 6 and Diff. Risk Attitude 7 were not elicited in March and June.  
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two groups (Δ R.T.+ and Δ R.T.-). The same is true for changes in their numeric risk and return 
expectations for the market portfolio, Diff. Market-Return-Num. and Diff. Market-Risk-Num. 
However, for changes in subjective/qualitative risk and return expectations for the market 
portfolio we find differences between the two groups. Investors who take more risks from one 
time period to the next (Δ R.T.+) expect market returns (Diff. Market-Return-Subj.) to be 
substantially higher over the next three month, while investors who take less risk (Δ R.T.-) expect 
market returns to stay fairly stable over time. Differences in changes in subjective market return 
expectations between the two groups are significant for all three time periods, suggesting that 
changes in subjective market return expectations are related to changes in risk taking. This result 
remains stable when we rerun the analysis only for investors who participated in all four surveys. 
The reverse is true for subjective market risk expectations (Diff. Market-Risk-Subj.): investors 
who take less risk from one time period to the next (Δ R.T.- ) expect market risk to increase for the 
next period, whereas investors who take more risk (Δ R.T.+ ) expect it to decrease. Table 7 finally 
shows that changes in past performance estimates are not related to changes in risk taking, as only 
Diff. Past Perf. Own Subj. is significantly different for the two groups for one period. 
Insert Table 7 here 
We use Tobit regressions to determine what combinations of factors drive changes in risk 
taking, since the dependent measure “Change in percentage of £100,000 invested into the market” 
is censored from below (-100) and from above (+100). Table 8 reports the results of multivariate 
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Tobit regressions with clustered standard errors of changes in risk taking from one time period to 
the next.
14
  
Column 1 of Table 8 shows that changes in self-reported risk attitude (Diff. Risk Attitude 
2) do not explain changes in risk taking, but the coefficients are in the right direction. This result 
still holds when we rerun the regression while excluding investors who reported the same risk 
attitude in two subsequent time periods. Column 2 shows that, in contrast to changes in risk 
attitude, changes in subjective risk and return expectations do explain changes in risk taking. The 
larger subjective market return expectations are in the current survey round compared to the 
previous round, the more risk is taken in the current round compared to the previous round. The 
greater the perceived level of risk of the market in the current round, the less risk is taken in the 
current round. The same regression with numeric instead of subjective estimates of expectations  
(Column 3) shows that changes in numeric expectations cannot explain changes in risk taking, 
confirming Hypothesis 2. The regression in Column 4 shows that changes in subjective market 
risk and return expectations continue to predict changes in risk taking even when numeric 
predictions variables are included, though changes in self-reported risk attitude also become 
marginally significant predictors. Marginal effects are almost identical to the regression 
coefficients.  
Finally we added demographic variables (Column 5) and numeric and subjective 
judgments about past market performance (Column 6) as predictors of changes in risk taking.
15
 As 
shown in Columns 5 and 6, neither group of variables predicts changes in risk taking, and neither 
                                                          
14
 Since Diff. Risk Attitude 6 and Diff. Risk Attitude 7 were not elicited at all time periods, they were not included in 
the analyses. We took into account that most investors participated in more than one survey by clustering our 
regressions over respondents. 
15
 We did not add income and wealth as those variables were less frequently available. 
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do changes in numeric market risk and return expectations. The only two variables that 
consistently and reliably predict changes in risk taking are changes in investors’ subjective 
expectations of market risks and returns.
16
 
Insert Table 8 and Figure 4 here 
 Support for Hypothesis 1(d) that changes in risk taking are mediated by changes in risk 
and return expectations is provided by the results of a mediation analysis (e.g., Shrout and Bolger, 
2002), summarized in Figure 4. For each of the three transitions in time (September 08 to 
December 08 to March 09 to June 09), we regressed risk taking in the two subsequent periods on a 
time dummy. As discussed earlier and shown by the significant regression coefficients for the 
direct link between time and risk taking in the bottom part of Figure 4, risk taking differed 
significantly between the two time periods for all three transitions. We next tested the 
precondition for possible mediation of changes in risk taking by changes in subjective risk and 
return expectations, namely whether risk and return expectations significantly differed between 
time periods. As shown by the coefficients for the links between time and either risk or return 
expectations on the left side of the top portion of Figure 4, this precondition was satisfied for two 
of the three time transitions. As shown by the coefficients for the links between both risk or return 
expectations and risk taking on the right side of the top portion of Figure 4, risk taking was 
significantly predicted by risk and return expectations across time periods. Most importantly, 
when risk and return expectations are added to the time dummy to predict risk taking, the time 
predictor is no longer significant for the two time transitions for which the precondition for 
                                                          
16
 As a robustness check we redid the analysis of Table 8 excluding extreme values for numeric changes. We define 
those by Diff. Market-Return-Num and Diff Post Perf. Market Num being larger than 50% and Diff.-Risk-Num being 
larger than 0.5. In regression 3, 5, and 6 we loose 4, 8 and 4 observations. The number 50% might look pretty large 
but there was a three month period where the real market return was about -25%. The results basically do not change.     
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mediation was satisfied (i.e., September 08 to December 08, and March 09 to June 09). The 
difference in magnitude and significance level of the indirect effect of time on risk taking, shown 
by the coefficients for that link in the top part of Figure 4, and the direct effect in the bottom part 
of Figure 4 provide evidence that changes in risk and return expectations successful mediate 
observed changes in risk taking over time.  
5 Conclusion 
In repeated surveys conducted between September 08 and June 09, a sample of Barclays 
online brokerage personal investors showed substantial changes in risk taking over time. Using 
risk-value models that allow for individual and situational differences in risk and return 
expectations as well as differences in self-reported risk attitude, we tie these changes in risk taking 
to changes in subjective expectations of risk and return, whereas risk attitudes remain remarkably 
stable over time, as one would expect from a psychological trait. Any existing small changes in 
self-reported risk attitude predict changes in risk taking only at marginal levels of significance. 
These results are stable when we control for past investment performance and demographics.  
Consistent with previous work on risk expectations (E. Weber et al., 2005), we find that 
qualitative subjective judgments of expected market risk and return predict risk taking, but that 
investors’ quantitative estimates of market returns and volatility, far closer to the traditional 
finance risk-return model, fail to predict observed changes in risk taking. Subjective judgments of 
risk and return expectation continue to be significant predictors of risk taking even when 
investors’ quantitative estimates of expected market returns and their volatility are included in the 
regression, suggesting that it is the more emotion-based components of these judgments that drive 
changes in risk taking. 
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In summary, our study extends previous findings in the literature on changes in risk taking, 
expectations, and risk attitudes in multiple important ways. First, our unique dataset allows us to 
analyze changes in risk taking, expectations, and risk attitudes of online broker customers. The 
personal investors in our sample are affluent and frequently trade in stocks and other securities, 
and are financially sophisticated. They do not show myopia in information use, in the sense that 
they do not use/substitute subjective risk and return expectations for their own personal portfolios 
when they make risky decisions involving the  market portfolio. They also do not show any halo 
effect in their numeric risk and return predictions,
17
 and their risk taking is not directly influenced 
by recent investment gains or losses. Thus it is fair to say that our results probably place a lower 
bound of the degree and type of irrationality that one might expect to see in a broader sample of 
personal investors.  
Whereas previous studies in the literature analyzed only changes in risk taking (see e.g. 
Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), in expectations (see e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003), or in risk 
attitude (see e.g. Sahm, 2007), our study examined the relationship between these variables. This 
allowed us to examine the mechanism or channel by which risk taking might change over time. 
Another fortuitous feature of our study is the fact that the first survey was conducted in the early 
part of September 08, i.e., just before extreme turmoil in financial markets. Hence, we are able to 
analyze the effect of substantial stock price drops on risk attitudes and expectations by comparing 
the expectations and attitudes shortly before the crisis to those during and after the crisis, using the 
same panel of investors. While only a direct manipulation of risk and return expectations would 
allow us to conclusively establish their causal role in changing risk taking, our within-subject 
repeated-measures design and the results of the mediation analysis strongly suggest that observed 
                                                          
17
 Though they do show one for their subjective judgments of expected risks and returns.  
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changes in risk taking over the survey period were the result of changes in subjective feelings 
about future market risk and return, and not the result of changes in risk attitude. 
We observed one significant change in self-reported risk attitude. Risk Attitude 6 (“I am a 
financial risk taker”) showed a significant increase (from 4.43 to 4.61) from September 08 to 
December 08, but in a direction inconsistent with the observed decline in risk taking over that 
time period. Investors who we know had been losing money in the stock market between 
September 08 and December 08, might have concluded that they must be greater risk taker than 
they had previously thought, in light of these losses. No such changes in self-reports of risk 
attitudes were observed for the more diagnostic self-report measure Risk Attitude2. 
Our findings should be valuable for banking practitioners. We show that risk attitudes - if 
measured correctly and without confounding effects - seem to be fairly stable and that changes in 
risk taking seem to be triggered by changes in risk and return expectations. Thus, practitioners 
urged, e.g, by the MiFID of the European Union (2006), to elicit their customers' risk profiles and 
risk preferences can argue that risk attitudes need not to elicited on a quarterly basis. Instead our 
results show that investors hold risk and return expectations that change significantly over time 
and seem to guide their investment behavior. Our data also show that these changing risk and 
return expectations are influenced by recent events, in a number of ways not consistent with 
rational theory, providing ample opportunity for investor education.  
Future research should investigate which other variables drive risk taking behavior. We 
know from previous studies that overconfidence and optimism (Nosic and Weber, 2010) as well 
as the anticipation of optimism on the part of others (Egan et al., 2011) lead to higher risk taking. 
There are most likely other psychological factors as well.  
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Our results indicate that it would be worthwhile for practitioners to elicit their clients' risk 
and return expectations more frequently and to provide some corrective feedback at the end of 
regular time periods, e.g., at the end of each calendar year, as investors seem to persistently 
underestimate and subjectively underappreciate the volatility of the market, putting hope over 
fear.  
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Table 1. Demographic characteristics 
The first two columns compare mean demographics for survey participants (Group
all
) to the adult 
British population (GB
all
) (from the U.K. Office for National Statistics). The next four columns 
report mean demographics for the subsets of participants who took part in only one survey 
(Group
once
), two surveys (Group
twice
), three surveys (Group
thrice
), or all four surveys (Group
four
). 
Age, Number of dependants, and Median gross income are self-explanatory. Gender and Marital 
status are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the investor is male and married or 
cohabitating, respectively. Investable wealth is measured in 9 categories from 1 (£0 - £10,000) to 
9 (> £1 million).  
 Group
all
 GB
all
   Group
once
 Group
twice
 Group
thrice
 Group
four
 
Age 51.42 47.66  50.77 50.65 51.43 54.45 
Number of 
dependents 
1.14 -  1.12 1.23 1.17 1.00 
Gender 0.93 0.49  0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96 
Median gross 
income (in £) 
60,000 30,000  60,000 60,000 65,000 53,000 
Marital status 0.74 -   0.76 0.70 0.77 0.72 
Investable wealth  
(in £) 
4.80 -  4.50 4.53 5.03 5.73 
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Table 2: Definition of survey variables  
Variable Question / Description 
Risk Taking  
Risk Taking 
Measures the (hypothetical) amount of money an individual is willing to 
invest into the FTSE-All-Share compared to a risk free asset with a 4% 
return (0 = invest everything into the risk free asset; 100 = invest everything 
into the risky stock market) 
Risk Attitude  
Risk Attitude 2 
"It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment." (1 = 
Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 6 "I am a financial risk taker." (1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 7 
"Even if I experienced a significant loss on an investment, I would still 
consider making risky investments." (1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly 
agree) 
Expectations  
Market-Return-Num. 
Measures individuals' return expectations for the FTSE-All-Share in 3 
months in percent 
Market-Risk-Num. 
Measures individuals' volatility expectations for the FTSE-All-Share in 3 
months by transforming estimates of bounds into volatility estimates. 
Market-Return-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns you expect from an investment in the UK 
stock market (FTSE-All- Share) over the next 3 months?" (1 = Extremely 
bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
Market-Risk-Subj. 
"Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the UK stock market 
(FTSE-All- Share) is?" (1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Own-Return-Num. 
Measures individuals' return expectations for the own portfolio at the bank in 
3 months in percent 
Own-Risk-Num. 
Measures individuals' volatility expectations for the own portfolio at the 
bank in 3 months transforming estimates of bounds into volatility estimates 
Own-Return-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns you expect from your own portfolio over 
the next 3 months?" (1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
Own-Risk-Subj. 
"Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the investments in your 
own portfolio are?" (1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Past Performance  
PastPerf.-External 
“What do you think the return of your investments held at other banks over 
the past 3 months was?” 
PastPerf.-Market-Num. 
"What is your best estimate of the return of the UK stock market (FTSE-All-
Share) over the past 3 months?" 
PastPerf.-Market-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns of the UK stock markets (FTSE-All-Share) 
over the past 3 months?" (1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
PastPerf.-Own-Num. 
"What do you think the return of your own portfolio over the past 3 months 
was?" 
PastPerf.-Own-Subj. 
"How would you rate the returns of your own portfolio over the past 3 
months?" (1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
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Table 3: Survey responses across time periods 
This table reports mean responses on indicated variables by time of elicitation. The last three 
columns provide z-statistics of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of differences between successive time 
periods, for those investors who participated in both time periods.  
* significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level. 
 Mean 
Difference 
Dec-Sept 
Difference 
Mar-Dec 
Difference 
June-Mar 
 Sept. Dec. March June z-score z-score z-score 
 (N=265) (N=305) (N=239) (N=188)    
        
Risk-Taking  56.02 52.77 46.52 53.47 -2.59** -3.90** 3.86** 
        
Risk Attitude 2 3.34 3.63 3.55 3.55 1.89 -0.73 0.46 
Risk Attitude 6 4.43 4.61 - - 2.51* -  
Risk Attitude 7 5.04 5.06 - - 0.39 -  
        
Market-Return-Num 1.57 3.57 5.42 4.25 1.66 3.31** -1.11 
Market-Risk-Num 0.052 0.075 0.072 0.090 7.29** -0.57 2.54** 
Market-Return-Subj 3.50 3.67 3.84 4.20 1.09 -0.48 2.52** 
Market-Risk-Subj 4.76 5.17 5.15 4.52 4.60** 1.53 -6.21** 
Own-Return-Num 4.38 6.23 8.18 5.98 2.94** 3.32** -0.59 
Own-Risk-Num 0.053 0.078 0.067 0.087 6.74** -2.56** 3.59** 
Own-Return-Subj 3.89 3.91 4.17 4.42 -1.09 2.60** 2.53** 
Own-Risk-Subj 4.20 4.45 4.53 4.34 3.68** 1.29 -2.32** 
        
PastPerf-Ext -2.14 -12.57 -3.19 11.83 -7.41** 3.62** 7.05** 
PastPerf-Market-Num -8.20 -16.79 -6.96 13.86 -8.20** 7.78** 10.09** 
PastPerf-Market-Subj 2.32 1.82 2.42 5.27 -7.43** 4.64** 9.99** 
PastPerf-Own-Num -7.70 -18.51 -8.48 13.14 -9.52** 7.03** 9.20** 
PastPerf-Own-Subj 2.95 2.33 2.92 4.66 -7.26** 4.26** 8.20** 
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Table 4: Correlations between return and risk expectation measures for market and own 
portfolio 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between (a) numeric and subjective 
measures of return and risk expectations for market and own portfolios, respectively; (b) 
assessments for market portfolio and own portfolio of return and risk expectations, assessed either 
numerically or subjectively, respectively; and (c) risk and return expectations assessed either for 
market or own portfolio, numerically or subjectively, respectively. Panel A presents the analysis 
for absolute levels of variables , Panel B for changes in those variables from the previous time 
period to the indicated time period.  
Panel A: Correlations of absolute levels of variables 
(a) Numeric--Subjective Correlation   
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Market Portfolio Own Portfolio Market Portfolio 
Own 
Portfolio 
 “Sept 08” 0.49 0.4 0.18 0.26 
 "Dec 08" 0.49 0.49 0.18 0.26 
 "March 09” 0.49 0.49 0.22 0.32 
 "June 09" 0.64 0.55 0.3 0.18 
      
(b) Market—Own Correlation    
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept 08" 0.48 0.47 0.63 0.27 
 "Dec 08" 0.56 0.51 0.63 0.37 
 "March 09” 0.64 0.45 0.58 0.31 
 "June 09" 0.61 0.64 0.59 0.37 
      
(c) Risk--Return Correlation    
      
  Market Portfolio Own Portfolio  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept 08" -0.05(ns) -0.26 0.21 0.1 
 "Dec 08" -0.02(ns) -0.31 0.3 -.04(ns) 
 "March 09” 0.12(ns) -0.32 0.29 -0.01(ns) 
 "June 09" -.01(ns) -0.21 .11(ns) .01(ns) 
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Panel B: Correlations of changes in variables from previous to indicated time period 
(a) Numeric--Subjective Correlation   
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Market Portfolio Own Portfolio Market Portfolio Own Portfolio 
 "Sept 08" --- --- --- --- 
 "Dec 08" 0.22 0.30 -0.02(ns) -0.06(ns) 
 "March 09” 0.18 0.25 0.07(ns) 0.07(ns) 
 "June 09" 0.49 0.36 0.15 0.05(ns) 
      
(b) Market--Own Correlation    
      
  Return  Risk  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept 08" --- --- --- --- 
 "Dec 08" 0.58 0.42 0.48 0.14 
 "March 09” 0.51 0.22 0.39 0.22 
 "June 09" 0.34 0.33 0.74 0.07(ns) 
      
(c) Risk--Return Correlation    
      
  Market Portfolio Own Portfolio  
 DATE Numeric Subjective Numeric Subjective 
 "Sept 08" --- --- --- --- 
 "Dec 08" 0.02(ns) -0.22 0.05(ns) -0.04(ns) 
 "March 09” 0.19 -0.09(ns) 0.11(ns) -0.06(ns) 
 "June 09" -0.00(ns) -0.12(ns) 0.02(ns) 0.01(ns) 
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Table 5: Predictors of risk taking 
This table reports regression coefficients of clustered Tobit regressions where standard errors take 
clustering over subjects into account. The dependent variable in each model is risk taking. 
Independent variables are: risk attitude, expectations, and past performance as well as 
demographic variables. The regressions include round dummies with round one as the baseline. 
Columns are explained in the text. *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, and 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
Decider is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor is the person primarily 
responsible for financial decisions in the household. Financial literacy is assessed using four 
questions. Each correct answer gives one point, i.e. the variable ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 (4) 
indicating low (high) financial literacy. Questions are taken from Van Rooij et al. (2011). For the 
exact wording of these questions see the Appendix. 
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Type of 
Variable  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Why? Risk Attitude 2 3.47 *** 3.30 *** 3.27 *** 3.03 *** 3.30*** 2.91*** 
Why? Market-Return-Num  0.24** 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 
Why? Market-Risk-Num  -19.25 -19.07 -45.20** -21.81 -61.82** 
Why? Market-Return-Subj  5.75*** 5.33*** 5.40*** 5.06*** 5.01*** 
Why? Market-Risk-Subj  -4.27*** -4.13*** -2.95*** -4.06*** -3.12*** 
Why? Own-Return-Num      0.13 
Why? Own-Risk-Num      18.84 
Why? Own-Return-Subj      0.64 
Why? Own-Risk-Subj      0.32 
Why? Past Perf. Market Num   -0.11  -0.08  
Why? Past Perf. Market Subj   0.87**  1.26  
Why? Past Perf. Own Num     -0.11  
Why? Past Perf. Own Subj     1.53*  
Who? Age    0.04  0.05 
Who? Gender    9.47*  9.05* 
Who? Dependents    1.67*  1.62* 
Who? Decider    -10.17  -9.71 
Who? Marital status    -5.00  -4.06 
Who? Financial literacy    0.62  1.00 
Who? Income (categorical)    0.19  0.27 
Who? Wealth    0.59  0.64 
When? Round 2 -4.33** -3.47* -3.76* -4.41* -3.99* -4.37* 
When? Round 3 -10.28*** -10.94*** -10.97*** -10.46*** -10.97*** -10.02*** 
When? Round 4 -2.83 -8.59*** -10.95*** -6.27** -10.57*** -6.68** 
 Constant 44.77*** 46.11*** 41.89*** 38.00*** 38.80*** 32.83*** 
 Observations 1264 1219 1216 876 1216 858 
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Table 6: Regression coefficients for effects of past performance variables on numeric and 
subjective return expectations for market and personal portfolio.  
This tables reports linear regression coefficients for the effect of past performance variables on 
numeric and subjective return expectations for market and personal portfolio. We include round 
dummies and individual fixed effects.  
*significant at 5% ; ** significant at 1% level.; *** significant at 0.1% level  
 
 
 
 
 Numeric Return Predictions Subjective Return Predictions 
 Market Portfolio Own Portfolio Market Portfolio Own Portfolio 
Predictors n = 1163 n = 1163 n = 1160 n = 1163 
PastPerf-Ext-Num -.025 -.051** -.004 -.000 
PastPerf-Market-Num    .256*** .171*** .001 .003 
PastPerf-Market-Subj -.878** .035 .110** .111*** 
PastPerf-Own-Num -.008 -.052* -.001 -.002 
PastPerf-Own-Subj -.012 .081 .128*** .085** 
Round 2 4.098*** 1.321 .362*** .146 
Round 3 3.732*** 3.596*** .366*** .171* 
Round 4 .817 -.130 .159 -.043 
Constant 5.430*** 5.042*** 2.843*** 3.393*** 
R² .072 .020 .109 .118 
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Table 7: Changes in risk attitudes, expectations and past performance 
Mean changes in reported risk attitudes, expectations and past performance across time periods, 
separately for investors who took more risk or less risk in the second time period. Variables as 
listed in Table 3. The Mann-Whitney rank-sum test statistic indicates whether the change in the 
row variable is different for these two groups. * significant at 5% ; ** significant at 1% level. 
 September - December  December – March March – June 
 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
>0 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
<0 
z-
score 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
>0 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
<0 
z-score 
Δ Risk 
Takin
g 
>0 
Δ Risk 
Taking 
<0 
z-
score 
Diff. Risk 
Attitude 2 
0.18 0.01 0.54 0.04 -0.09 1.19 0.14 0.12 0.60 
Diff. Risk 
Attitude 6 
-0.01 0.22 -1.23 - - - - - - 
Diff. Risk 
Attitude 7 
0.03 -0.04 0.22 - - - - - - 
Diff. Market-
Return-Num 
0.94 3.94 -0.07 3.13 0.52 1.40 -0.14 -2.39 1.45 
Diff. Market-
Risk-Num 
0.02 0.03 -0.62 0.00 -0.01 1.57 0.02 0.02 0.35 
Diff. Market-
Return-Subj 
0.40 -0.03 2.02* 0.51 0.05 2.47* 0.58 -0.18 2.31* 
Diff. Market-
Risk-Subj 
-0.05 0.56 -3.35** -0.20 -0.02 -1.21 -0.69 -1.12 1.19 
Diff. Own-
Return-Num 
2.98 3.25 -0.25 3.15 3.41 -0.56 0.73 -0.15 1.36 
Diff. Own-Risk-
Num 
0.03 0.02 0.93 0.00 -0.02 2.09* 0.02 0.02 -0.43 
Diff. Own-
Return-Subj 
-0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.30 0.02 1.33 0.59 -0.03 2.07* 
Diff. Own-Risk-
Subj 
0.24 0.32 -0.77 0.46 0.06 1.27 -0.25 -0.18 -0.32 
Diff. Past Perf. 
External 
-8.99 -14.83 0.56 5.57 4.47 0.15 16.37 18.71 -1.52 
Diff. Past Perf. 
Market Num 
-11.84 -5.88 -1.42 9.04 10.10 -0.70 25.40 20.70 0.87 
Diff. Past Perf. 
Market Subj 
-0.70 -0.67 -0.17 0.35 0.68 -1.18 2.96 2.91 0.07 
Diff. Past Perf. 
Own Num 
-13.00 -12.89 0.60 11.60 8.91 0.40 22.71 19.11 0.94 
Diff.PastPerf. 
Own Sub 
-0.55 -0.87 1.54 0.80 0.14 2.54** 2.07 1.70 0.20 
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Table 8: Predictors of changes in risk taking.  
This table reports regression coefficients of Tobit regressions where standard errors take 
clustering over subjects into account. The dependent variable in each model is changes in risk 
taking (Diff. Risk Taking). Independent variables are changes in: risk attitude, expectations, and 
past performance as well as demographic variables. All changes or differences variables are 
calculated for each person separately, as the value on the current survey minus the value on the 
previous survey. Columns are explained in the text. 
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, and *** significant at the 1% level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Diff. Risk Attitude 2 0.93 0.98 1.23* 1.30* 1.23* 1.20* 
Diff. Market-Return-Num   0.28 0.17 0.24 0.26 
Diff. Market-Risk-Num   1.47 1.95 1.83 3.05 
Diff. Market-Return-Subj  2.62***  2.03** 1.91** 2.09** 
Diff. Market-Risk-Subj  -1.45*  -1.44* -1.44* -1.53* 
Diff. Past Perf. Market Num      -0.05 
Diff. Past Perf. Market Subj      0.48 
Age     -0.09 -0.08 
Gender     5.56 2.92 
Dependents     -0.17 -0.10 
Decider     7.10 6.97 
Marital status     2.04 1.74 
Financial literacy     -0.58 -0.70 
Dummy-Period 2-1 -12.36 -10.26*** -12.58*** -10.24*** -10.47*** -10.49** 
Dummy-Period 3-2 -14.48*** -12.89*** -15.92*** -13.78*** -13.81*** -13.36*** 
Constant 7.99*** 6.09*** 8.10*** 6.05*** -0.34 1.79 
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Observations 572 569 532 529 526 519 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Value of Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) all-share index representing approximately 
98% of the UK’s market capitalization from June 08 to September 09. 
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Figure 2. 
Mean percentage invested into risky market portfolio (diamond symbols), mean subjective market 
risk expectation (triangle symbols), and mean subjective market return expectation (square 
symbols) at four consecutive assessed time points. 
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Figure 3. 
Distribution in percentage of self-reported risk attitudes (Risk Attitude 2: “It is likely I wold invest 
a significant sum in a high risk investment” with categories ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 
7=strongly agree), by time of elicitation (Round 1 = Sept 08, Round 2 = Dec 08, Round 3 = 
March 09, Round 4 = June 09). 
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Figure 4. 
 
Results of Mediation Analysis. 
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Appendix  
 
Variable (Order) Exact wording of survey questions 
Risk Taking  
Risk Taking (3)  
(3) = Third question 
“Now imagine you have an overall wealth of £100,000 and you could invest 
this amount either in a risk-free investment with a safe interest rate of 4% or 
into the UK stock market (FTSE all-share). How much would you invest in 
the in the UK stock market (FTSE all-share)?” 
 (0 = invest everything into the risk free asset; 100 = invest everything into 
the risky stock market). 
Risk Attitude  
Risk Attitude 2 (7)  
“It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment.” 
(1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 6 (8) 
“I am a financial risk taker.”  
(1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Risk Attitude 7 (9) 
“Even if I experienced a significant loss on an investment, I would still 
consider making risky investments.” 
(1 = Strongly disagree ... 7 = Strongly agree) 
Expectations  
Market-Return-Num. 
Market-Risk-Num(4). 
“In the next questions, we would like you to make three estimates of future 
stock market returns. 
* Your middle estimate should be your best guess (as likely be above the 
actual value as below it); 
* Your high estimate should be lower than the actual value very rarely 
(about once in 20 estimates); 
* Your low estimate should be above the actual value very rarely (about 
once in 20 estimates); 
 
Please enter your response as a percent, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as -X%. 
The return of the UK stock market (FTSE all-share) in 3 months:” 
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For Market-Return-Num. the middle estimate is used. 
For Market-Risk-Num. the implicit expected volatility is calculated from the 
high and low estimates using the two-point approximation by Keefer and 
Bodily (1983). 
Market-Return-Subj.(1) 
“How would you rate the returns you expect from an investment in the UK 
stock market (FTSE-All- Share) over the next 3 months?”  
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
Market-Risk-Subj.(2) 
“Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the UK stock market 
(FTSE-All- Share) is?”  
(1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Own-Return-Num. 
Own-Risk-Num. (12) 
“In the next questions, we would like you to make three estimates of future 
returns on investments held with us. 
* Your middle estimate should be your best guess (as likely be above the 
actual value as below it); 
* Your high estimate should be lower than the actual value very rarely 
(about once in 20 estimates); 
* Your low estimate should be above the actual value very rarely (about 
once in 20 estimates); 
 
Please enter your response as a percent, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as -X%. 
 
The return of your portfolio held with us in 3 months time:” 
 
For Own-Return-Num. the middle estimate is used. 
For Own-Risk-Num. the implicit expected volatility is calculated from the 
high and low estimates using the two-point approximation by Keefer and 
Bodily (1983). 
Own-Return-Subj.(13) 
“How would you rate the returns you expect from your own portfolio over 
the next 3 months?”  
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
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Own-Risk-Subj.(14) 
“Over the next 3 months, how risky do you think the investments in your 
own portfolio are?”  
(1 = Not risky at all ... 7 = Extremely risky) 
Past Performance  
PastPerf.-External (15) 
“What do you think your return (percentage change) of investments held 
elsewhere over the past three months was? 
 
If you hold all of your investable assets with us, enter zero. 
 
Please enter your response as a percent change, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as 
-X%.” 
PastPerf.-Market-Num. 
(10) 
“What do you think the UK stock market (FTSE all-share) return 
(percentage change) over past three months was? 
Please enter your response as a percent change, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as 
-X%.” 
PastPerf.-Market-Subj 
(11). 
“How would you rate the returns of the UK stock markets (FTSE-All-Share) 
over the past 3 months?” 
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
PastPerf.-Own-Num.(5) 
“What do you think your return (percentage change) with us over past three 
months was? 
Please enter your response as a percent change, i.e. a rise as X%, or a fall as 
-X%.” 
PastPerf.-Own-Subj.(6) 
“How would you rate the returns of your portfolio (all investments held with 
us) over the past three months?” 
(1 = Extremely bad ... 7 = Extremely good) 
Other Variable
18
   
Financial Literacy 
“Suppose you had £100 in a savings account, the interest rate was 10% per 
year and you never withdraw the money or the interest payments. After 5 
years, how much do you think you would have in the account in total?” 
 
More than £150/Exactly £150/Less than £150/Do not know 
                                                          
18
 Financial Literacy and other demographic variables were only assessed once, i.e. in the first round.  
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“Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and 
inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy 
with the money in this account?”  
 
More than today /Exactly the same/Less than today/Do not know 
 
“When an investor spreads money among different assets, does the risk of 
losing money” 
 
Increase/Decrease/Stay the same/Do not know 
 
“If the interest rate rises, what should happen to bond prices?” 
Rise/Fall/Stay the same/Do not know 
Decider 
“Are you the person in the household primarily responsible for financial 
decisions in the household?”   
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 
 
  
